Hybrid threats: A new dimension in asymmetric conflict

CHAPTER-II

HYBRID THREATS: A NEW DIMENSION IN ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT

“The categories of warfare are blurring and no longer fit into neat, tidy boxes. One can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction - from the sophisticated to the simple - being employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare”

- Robert M. Gates, Former U.S. Secretary of Defense

1.In 1944, the impending victors of World War II gathered at Dumbarton Oaks Mansion in Washington, D.C. to lay the foundations for the post-war global political and security governance structure. That same year, at Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, world leaders set the stage for the world’s international financial institutions. What followed was the establishment of the United Nations system and International agreements on trade, tariffs and currencies. The result was never before experienced levels of peace, security and economic prosperity worldwide. Today after six decades of unprecedented economic interdependence and technological innovation, defence, security and economic challenges are more interconnected than ever and therefore more complex. What is needed to respond to threats environment is a new set of hybrid political, security and economic solutions.[1]

2.A hybrid force is a military organisation that employs a combination of conventional and unconventional organisations, equipment, and techniques in a unique environment designed to achieve synergistic strategic effects. This definition relies on previous research and discussions by hybrid theorists on hybrid warfare as useful starting points for thinking about hybrid warfare within the spectrum of modern conflicts.

3.A hybrid threat uniquely focuses on organisational capability and generally attempts to gain an asymmetrical advantage over purely conventional opponents within a specific environment. This advan­tage not only asserts itself in the realm of pure military force, but also in a more holistic manner across all the elements of national power including diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement/legal. The advantage generates the effect of transitioning the rules of the battlefield from those of a conventional fight to those realms of a hybrid’s choosing—primarily in the categories of tempo, depth, and intensity. As a result, a weaker military opponent can stand against a stronger one for an indefinite period and continue to generate effects that a more conventional opponent could not generate in the same situation. This hybrid capability poses significant difficulties for large conventional military organizations such as the u.s. military because these large conventional structures are oriented primarily on symmetrical type adversaries, or in the lesser case asymmetrical type adversaries, but never on an efficient combination of the two. Thoroughly understanding this capability can offer insight into methods of understanding and predicting hybrid organizations.

4.Historical examples of hybrid type warfare reach back to antiquity, even though the term hybrid threat is relatively recent. In ancient Rome, a hybrid force of criminal bandits, regular soldiers and unregulated fighters employed tactics ranging from that of fixed battle, roadside ambush, and the employ­ment of stolen siege engines against Vespasian’s Roman legions during the Jewish rebellion of 66 AD in the Peninsular War of 1806, a hybrid force of Spanish guerillas combined with regular British and Portuguese forces to generate decisive military effects on Napoleon’s Grand Armee. During World War II, the Soviet Army on the Eastern front integrated and synchro­nised an ill-equipped irregular force with its conventional military forces in order to generate multiple hybrid type effects from 1941 to 1945. During the Vietnam war, the People’s army of Vietnam—the North Vietnamese regular army—synchronised its operations with the Viet Cong, an irregular force, in order to sustain a lengthy conflict against the superior conventional forces of two separate first world nations: France and the U.S. The non-state actor in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, Lebanese Hezbollah, combined the aspects of conventional and unconventional war to fight against the premier conventional military power in the middle east, the israeli defense forces.13 in each of these historical cases, trends emerge which, arguably, suggest why and how hybrid forces exist, enabling observers and analysts to anticipate the manifestation of hybrid threats in the future.

5.Regardless of the plentitude of historical examples, a persistent obstacle to understanding the hybrid threat has been a seeming inability to classify what a hybrid threat is and why a hybrid threat coalesces in the first place. the conflicting definitions for this age-old construct have stymied the abil­ity of military theorists and planners to properly envision a common set of hybrid threat motivations and potential actions. Fundamentally, the prob­lem is the gap that exists between the cognitive logic of “definition” and the uniqueness of each context in which “hybrid” manifests itself. No definition can be adequate to multiple contexts that differ in time, space, and logic.

6.This indicates the need for a theory suggesting principles that shed light on the nature and manifestation of hybrid organisations in hybrid conflicts. This problem of the shortcomings in current thinking about hybrid threats is particularly relevant now in a time of emerging non-state actors and changing state actor dynamics in the Middle East, Africa, and the Pacific. The exponential increases in the availability of information and communication technology and the proliferation of military tactics and weaponry enhance an already strong tendency for western militaries to substitute information for understanding as well as identify technical solu­tions to discrete military problems. So this dearth of insight into the nature and potentialities of hybrid conflict becomes even more problematic and dangerous.

7.Hybrid warfare is conducted by irregular forces that have access to the more sophisticated weapons and systems normally fielded by regular forces. Hybrid warfare may morph and adapt throughout an individual campaign, as circumstances and resources allow. It is anticipated that irregular groups will continue to acquire sophis­ticated weapons and technologies and that intervention forces will need to confront a variety of threats that have in the past been associated primarily with the regular armed forces of states.

Potential Hybrid Threat Scenarios

8.There are numerous scenarios that could be employed to explore the parameters of the hybrid threat. While American policy makers may be focused on non-state actors, the emergence of hybrid threats at the state level should not be discounted. One could examine the dissolution of Pakistan into chaos, split between armed fundamentalists and existing political elites who may retain the loyalty of a part of the Army. Additionally, one could postulate another Russian expeditionary thrust into a border state like the 2008 invasion of Georgia, where elements of hybrid warfare were manifested by mixes of regular and irregular forces, although Russia’s combined arms attack was certainly the decisive element.

9.Mexico’s expanding narco-insurgency is another potential scenario, where we have seen extensive civilian casualties and terrorism, as well as a steadily growing degree of sophistication in the use of military hardware. The challenge of gangs as a form of disruptive force inside America and in Mexico portends greater problems down the road. The plot for such a scenario might envision the formation of a supra-cartel displacing the state or at least creating a regional entity, but that may be regarded as a Black Swan scenario. One could postulate a transplanted version of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC). An Iranian-trained, Venezuelan-funded force in South American or Panama is not far-fetched.18 While it is now isolated, and losing critical leaders, the potential for the FARC to transform itself in the region should not be ignored. A requiem for the FARC is extremely premature.

10.A far more likely scenario is a major stabilization operation in North Korea that is contested by the former regime with a prepared resistance that is well resourced. The potential for a North Korean implosion followed by a long-term resistance movement by ideological fanatics is not beyond consideration. American policymakers and scholars are aware of the potential chaos that a North Korean meltdown could produce, and are exploring potential “futures.” North Korea has apparently taken many lessons from the insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Hezbollah and adapted its military posture to include more hybrid methods. Though speculative, a collapse of the North Korean regime could set in motion a series of events that will prove far more challenging than the take down of Saddam Hussein’s regime. In such a scenario, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) security or elimination operations will be a high priority U.S. military mission, followed by working with our South Korean allies on stability operations. However, the prospects of a virulent resistance by North Korean special operations forces would increase the costs of these stability operations and increase the risk to any allied forces operating in the north, as well as to any efforts to secure facilities and personnel. North Korea, sometimes referred to as a Soprano State, has proven itself capable of acting as a state-level hybrid threat, including official acts of criminal sovereignty.

11.The most obvious scenario for a real rather than speculative hybrid threat is Iran, which is a state committed to opposing U.S. interests. As such, it has both the will and the capability already of serving as a full hybrid opponent. It is likely that policymakers would try indirect and standoff approaches early in such a conflict. But it is possible that a major intervention of U.S. ground forces could be required to achieve the significant, even critical, U.S. interests in the region. Dr. Krepinevich suggested such a scenario with what he called the “Streetfighter State.” The hope that moderates or pragmatists would gain the upper hand atop Iran’s power pyramid has not been realized. The revolutionary clerics have strengthened their hand against the reformers, but did so by allocating more power to their enforcers of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The result has been the rise of the Pasdaran as the ultimate Guardians of the Revolution, creating the potential for a Praetorian Guard or a Praetorian state. Future crises could arise in the next decade as the result of succession challenges or in response to crackdowns against democratic and moderate elements.28

While Iran has been developing its strategic nuclear deterrent and a second tier deterrent of ballistic missiles targeted against its regional neighbors, it has also begun to adapt the IRGC and its internal security force cum militia, the Basij. This tier seeks to both suppress domestic resistance and strengthen the Guard and Basij to better resist internal power struggles or any U.S. intervention. The ideology of these forces has been focused into a culture that emphasizes Islamic virtue, jihad and resistance, and heroic martyrdom.

[1] A Hybrid Framework For A Hybrid World, Managing Across Boundaries Initiative, www.stimson.org (accessed on 29 Jun 2014)