Countering the communist insurgencies: foreign models

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CHAPTER IV

COUNTERING THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES: FORIEIGN MODELS

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35.The communist insurgency has been prevalent in many other countries except India. The ideology and the root causes been similar to the Left Wing Extremism being experienced by us. Hence, it would be prudent enough to carry out an analysis in brief of the counter communist insurgency models adopted by some of the counties to draw out the lessons and their suitability in our context.

THAILAND MODEL

36.Thailand has experienced the communist insurgency in its country since 1920, with the establishment of communist party of Thailand. The cause of the communist insurgency was the selective development in the country and neglect of rural areas which caused resentment and alienated the locals and led to local insurrections. It grew steadily in the 1960s and the communist ideologues fully exploited the situation. The cadre strength of the communist party was at its peak in the 1970s which was pegged at 12000. However, the Thai government has successfully downplayed communist insurgency in the country by the late 1980s. The government employed “coordinated government efforts combining military and police actions with social and economic policies”, which effectively reduced the level of insurgency. The 1970s signalled the Thai government’s resolve to put an end to the communist insurgency, by increasing the effectiveness of its counterinsurgency operations. In 1974, the government established the Internal Security Operational Command (ISOC) under the military’s Supreme Command to coordinate and integrate the counterinsurgency efforts of various government agencies[49]. The focus was on neutralising the insurgent’s tactics as well as their ideology rather than killing them, to achieve increased coordination among the police, military and the civil administration which was achieved by the 1980s. The government’s policy was a balance between an development centric and enemy centric approach wherein the political and the social aspects was addressed thorough development measures and amnesty policies to induce surrender in conjunction with Thai military conducting surgical and offensive operations against guerrillas in their base areas. The government’s approach resulted in the weakening of the communist movements and the increased surrender of more insurgents, which led to the elimination of insurgency in the country[50].

PERUVIAN MODEL

37.The Communist Party of Peru, more commonly known as the Shining Path is a Maoist guerrilla insurgent organization in Peru. When it first launched the internal conflict in Peru in 1980, its stated goal was to replace what it saw as bourgeois democracy with "New Democracy". The Shining Path believed that by establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat, inducing cultural revolution, and eventually sparking world revolution, they could arrive at pure communism[51]. The initial response by the government in 1980s was reactive leading to an aggressive counter insurgency campaign. The government imposed an emergency zone in which the basic rights of the civilians were suspended and it gave sweeping powers to the military. This repressive campaign led to violence, human rights violation, steep decline in military’s credibility and further consolidating mass support to the Shining Path. The reliance on fielding an exclusive military response with lack of social and economic development helped the Maoists.

38.In 1992 the government undertook aggressive military operations along with development and provided security to locals. They created a joint task force of the military, intelligence bureau and the police.The image of the military got a makeover with the focus shifting to winning the hearts and minds of the villages. Self-defence groups were formed from among the local peasantry to defend themselves. The capture of Abimael Guzman in 1992 represented a symbolic victory in the counterinsurgency efforts although it created optimism and it marked the beginning of a new era in Peru[52]. He was the father of the movement and his capture led to the shining path disintegrating into various groups as there was no worthy leader after him to continue the movement. However, during this period there were a large number of extra judicial killings by the security forces. Since, 2009 nine out of top 10 leaders of Shining path was killed by the police led capture operations. The insurgency still exists in penny pockets but breathing its last.

PHILIPPINES MODEL

39.The Communist Party of the Philippines is a leading communist party in the Philippines. It has been fighting a guerrilla war against the state since the late 1960s. It remains an underground political organization since its founding on December 26, 1968 and has been operating in clandestine manner since its founding. It aims to overthrow the Philippine government through armed revolution with its direct leadership over the New People's Army and National Democratic Front[53]. Initially the strategy of the government was primarily using force against force. The military established camps in affected areas and conducted search and destroy operations. The strategy, however, failed as the military moved out after clearing an area and the insurgents avoided contact by shifting their bases accordingly. Moreover, there were human rights violations in such operations.

40.After unsuccessfully tackling the insurgency a strategic plan composed of four stages was evolved departing from the conventional military operations against the communists. The four stages were clear, hold, consolidate and develop. The main weapon of the campaign was civil military operation (CMO), a strategy that embraces the political, economic, social and psychological aspects of military operations. CMO includes actions embracing the relationship between the military forces and, authorities, people in the area of operations and development assistance activities. Civil relations, home defence, intelligence and tactical operations were integrated harmoniously in the general development efforts of the government[54]. However, due to the prevailing economic conditions there were not enough resources to cater for the development activities and the CMO. The communists took advantage of the situation and consolidated further.

41.The policy was later revised and made people friendly as the population was correctly identified as the Centre of gravity, the military focussed more on winning the hearts and minds of villagers and a previously raised notorious paramilitary force, the civilian home defence force of 65000 strong was disbanded and a new civilian force with strict selection process and trained by the military was formed. The main weapon of the military was the special operations team (SOT) which was trained in combat operations, psychological operations and intelligence with the aim of destroying the political organisation of the communists, gather intelligence and deny recruitment bases. This was a huge success and broke the back of the movement, however, due to failure of peace talks, lack of development and changing focus of the military towards external defence the movement revived in the late 90s. The insurgency though weakened still exists in some form in the country.

MALAYAN MODEL

42.The communist party was established in Malaya in the 1930s due to common issues like poor economic and social conditions with an aim to overthrow the government by use of armed struggle and establish a proletariat order. Racially, the members of the Malay Communist Party were almost entirely Chinese and their base of support was confined to the Chinese community which at that time constituted less than 40 per cent of the total population[55]. The initial response of the government was to treat it as a law and order problem. Accordingly, the military and the police was used to curb the movement with suppressive measures which alienated the locals and aided the communists in enhancing their support bases.

43.Later, a coherent strategy was applied in which the local population was relocated to new settlements in order to divorce the population from the insurgents which were the prime sources of information, food and shelter. The new settlement centres were provide with all basic amenities and ownership to nearby land as also protection from locally raised home guards and the police. A well-coordinated anti insurgency campaign was launched by the military by well-trained troops in jungle warfare to hunt down the communists. These measures were complemented with aggressive psychological operations. These operations included dropping of pamphlets by air, safe conduct passes, “voice” aircrafts, the questionnaire, rewards, pardons and collective punishments[56]. The government backed it up with economic development and generation of employment opportunities. Eventually, it became very difficult for the insurgents to come out of the jungles in search of food, medicines and recruitment leading to defeat of the communist insurgency in Malaya.

LESSONS LEARNT

44.The analysis of the similar kinds of communist insurgencies in many other countries makes it evident that there are no single, quick fix solutions to the problem and it will require a coherent and well-coordinated strategy to tackle the menace. The lessons learned from the handling of these insurgencies by various governments are given out in succeeding paras:

(a)Military alone is not the solution to any kind of insurgency. Application of force is counterproductive and would lead to further alienation of the local population leading to further strengthening of the communist movement.

(b)The main cause in all communist insurgencies is poor economic and social environment, deprivation and suppression of the poor and selective development. These cannot be dealt singularly by the military and there is a requirement of political and coordinated efforts to eradicate these problems. The enemy centric and the development centric approach have to go hand in hand.

(c)There has to be a central agency like the Internal Security Operational Command (ISOC) established by the Thai government to coordinate and control the operations and disjointed efforts by states or the police, military and the civil administration would not yield the desired results.

(d)Psychological operations need to be conducted aggressively to complement the overall strategy with an aim to induce surrenders, desertions and reduce the recruitment bases.

(e)Imposition of emergency in affected rural areas and giving a free hand to the military will lead to repressive campaigns, violence, human rights violations and extra judicial killings. This will further strengthen the movement and erode the military’s credibility.

(f)Providing security to the local population and divorcing them from the insurgents by resettling the population along with provision of basic amenities and ownership of land will isolate the insurgents, who can be eliminated with ease by focussed anti insurgency campaign by the military and the police.

(g)Winning hearts and minds of the local populace in conjunction with swift and surgical operations by the military will provide the armed forces with a humane face and will not alienate the villagers, who are the Centre of gravity of any insurgency.

(h)A high degree of jointness between the military, police, civil administration and intelligence is a prerequisite of a successful counter insurgency campaign.

(j)The elimination of leadership in communist cadres is significant as was evident in Peru, due to the hierarchical structure of the communist organisations and it takes time to replace a well-established and respected leader unlike the ground soldiers.

(k)The military surely can create conditions which are favourable to the government, however if the initiative is lost by not backing it up with sound economic development, it can be counterproductive.

(l)A paramilitary force or a civilian defence force drawn from the locals can act as a force multiplier if they are disciplined, selected, motivated and trained by the specialists otherwise they can be a nuisance and no more than any other vigilante group violating the human rights.

45. The lessons brought out clearly indicate that there are no quick fix solutions and military alone cannot be the solution. There has to be a well-coordinated strategy and military is certainly an important part, which is clearly evident in the study of above models. There is a need to analyse the options as to how the armed forces of our country can be applied in the Naxal affected areas to tackle the menace effectively.

[49] http://www.army.mil.ph/OG5_articles/Insegencies.htm

[50] http://www.army.mil.ph/OG5_articles/Insegencies.htm

[51] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shining_Path

[52] THE SHINING PATH OF PERU: DEFEATED OR ALIVE? A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the The School of Continuing Studies and of The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Liberal Studies By Edgar Malone, B.A. Georgetown University Washington, DC November 19, 2010

[53] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_the_Philippines

[54] COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINES by Jacinto C. Ligot June, 1994.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a283972.pdf

[55] Communist insurgency in the Philippines by Jacito C Ligot, June 1994.Pp 57-58

[56] Communist insurgency in the Philippines by Jacito C Ligot, June 1994. Pp 61